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Abstract
A thorny problem in identifying the determinants of reservation wages and particularly the
role of continued joblessness in their evolution is the simultaneity issue. We deploy a control
function approach to the problem that involves conditioning elapsed duration on completed
unemployment duration in the reservation wage equation. Our analysis confirms that the use
of elapsed duration alone compounds two separate and opposing influences. Only with the
inclusion of completed duration is the negative effect of continued joblessness on reservation
wages apparent.
JEL classification numbers: J64, J65
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paper.
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1. Introduction
In job search theory, the reservation wage is the lowest offered wage that an un-
employed individual searching the market is prepared to accept. The notion of a
reservation wage corresponds to the solution of a standard optimal stopping rule
problem. Under fairly general conditions, it can be shown that the reservation
wage is a function of net search costs, the arrival rate of job offers, and the wage
offer distribution. Familiarly, and in general, higher reservation wages decrease the
probability of reemployment and thus prolong the duration of unemployment. The
primary exogenous driver here would be an improved generosity of unemployment
insurance benefits.
But there is a potential simultaneity issue, the nature of which is aptly described
in Lancaster (1985: 113-114). The setting is one in which an unemployed person
selects a sequence of reservation wages as a deterministic, decreasing function of
time, receives random wage offers, and stops searching on the first occasion on
which a wage offer exceeding the reservation wage is encountered. Lancaster notes
that were we to randomly sample the population of such individuals and observe
their reservation wage, W , and elapsed search duration, U , we might reasonably
conclude that an individual searcher jobless for an extended period is likely to have
been using a relatively high reservation wage. However, given that the reservation
declines over time, the implication is that the longer the interval of joblessness,
the lower the individual’s reservation wage must be. In other words, ‘... there are
two causal relationships between W and U in one of which W is a deterministic
function of the date and in the other the elapsed duration of unemployment is a
(stochastic) function of W . The U we observe is both the date and a realization
of the random elapsed duration ...’.1
The issue of whether the reservation wage is constant or declining over the spell
of joblessness is of interest from the perspectives of theory, empirics, and policy. At
1Lancaster further argues that there will be two causal relationships between the accepted wage and completed
duration S (as opposed to elapsed duration U ) since the offered wage is an increasing function of the reservation
wage. Note that we are here replacing Lancaster’s symbols for the reservation wage and elapsed/completed
durations of unemployment with those used in the present paper.
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the level of theory, there is an important distinction between constant and declining
reservation wages. For its part, the constant reservation wage model lends itself to
an accessible and parsimonious way of recouping the structural parameters of the
optimal job search model (Lancaster and Chesher, 1983). Recognition of declining
reservation wages, on the other hand, allows for a distinctly richer model and
one that critically exploits the feedback mechanism running from unemployment
duration to reservation wages (Kiefer and Neumann, 1979; Lancaster, 1985).
Empirically, the two models have very different structural content. The simple
constant reservation wage model does not raise identification problems because by
definition unemployment duration does not affect reservation wages. But reserva-
tion wages could change over time for a variety of reasons, including the termina-
tion/diminution of unemployment insurance benefits, the exhaustion of financial
assets, the depreciation of human capital, or stigmatization by employers. With
declining reservation wages, as we have seen, an endogeneity problem arises be-
cause of the simultaneity between reservation wages and unemployment duration;
that is to say, the reservation wage not only influences joblessness but it is also
affected by unemployment duration.
From a policy perspective, reservation wages offer policy-makers an added mar-
gin of adjustment by allowing them to influence the path of reservation wages over
time. Thus, unemployment insurance rules can be manipulated via changes in the
replacement rate and/or the maximum duration of entitlements, or by substituting
‘social help’ for unemployment insurance benefits proper, etc. In this way, policies
have implications for nonstationary reservation wages.
Previous studies have rarely investigated the relationship between reservation
wages and unumployment duration directly. Where they have done so, the in-
formation in question has typically been collected as a snapshot, cross-section in
form (Jones, 1988; Prasad, 2003; Sestito and Viviano, 2008). Accordingly, those
analysts seeking to examine the course of reservation wages have used elapsed or
incomplete unemployment duration as a regressor. But in this set-up elapsed du-
ration is influenced by expected completed duration (stock sampling plan), forcing
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analysts to rely on potentially invalid instruments.
However, if one has the good fortune to possess longitudinal data with repeated
observations on reservation wages, information on completed unemployment dura-
tion can be used to great advantage, namely as an argument of the control function
used to construct a consistent estimator of the rate of decline in reservation wages.
In other words, being able to condition on completed duration enables one to
divine the impact of elapsed duration on reservation wages.
The intuition behind the ‘trick’ used here is straightforward. A regression of
reservation wages on elapsed unemployment duration is dogged by reverse causal-
ity precisely because higher reservation wages will generate longer completed du-
rations and, by implication, longer completed durations entail longer elapsed du-
rations. The trick is, then, to include both elapsed and completed duration in
the set of regressors. Interestingly, this technique shares commonalities with the
tenure-earnings literature where better matches produce higher earnings and longer
lasting jobs, and where analogously information on completed job duration is re-
quired to obtain a consistent estimate of the impact of current tenure on wages
(see Abraham and Farber, 1987).
In short, our intention is to offer a practical means of establishing whether
reservation wage do indeed decline over the course of joblessness.
2. The estimation approach
Let W denote the reservation wage, Z a vector of observed exogenous variables
(individual and calendar effects), U the elapsed duration of stay in the state of
unemployment. The completed unemployment spell will have duration denoted
by S. Our approach is motived by the existance of sample information for both
U and S. The set-up borrows from Matzkin (2004) for the econometrics and from
Lancaster (1985) for the economic rationale.
We want to identify the function m in the model
W = m(U,Z, ǫ), (1)
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where m is an unknown function that is strictly increasing in ǫ, and ǫ represents
explanatory unobserved variables. ( ǫ may be dubbed the ‘propensity to search’.)
More modestly, we may just be interested in identifying the average partial effect
E{∂m(U,Z, ǫ)/∂U}, (2)
measuring the effect of an increase in elapsed unemployment duration on the av-
erage reservation wage.
The identification problem stems from the likely endogeneity of U , as pointed
out by Lancaster (1985). The argument runs as follows. Even when the reservation
wage is a decreasing function of time, a sampled long elapsed duration may indicate
high propensity to search and, consequently, a high W vs U ‘schedule’. In other
words, higher reservation wages induce higher continuing and hence completed
durations (an implication of basic job search theory) which, in turn, are correlated
with elapsed durations.
The key identifying assumption is that, conditional on the complete duration
S, U and ǫ are independent (given Z). This assumption seems quite likely to
be met. Indeed, by controlling for S, one controls for the individual unobserved
heterogeineity (propensity to search) that accounts for the reverse causation from
W to U .
Matzkin (2004) shows that the identification condition is equivalent to the ex-
istence of a function (‘control function’) r and a random variable η independent
of U such that ǫ = r(S, η). We may thus write W = m(U,Z, r(S, η)).
The argument is easier to follow focusing on the mean estimation of separable
models
W = m(U,Z) + ǫ, (3)
with E[ǫ|U,Z] = E[ǫ|U ] 6= 0. The identifying assumption becomes
E[ǫ|U, S, Z] = E[ǫ|S] = c(S) (4)
for some function c, the control function. Then,
E[W |U, S, Z] = m(U,Z) + c(S), (5)
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which for known c enables the identification of m.
For linear m and c
E[W |Z,U, V ] = α′Z + βU + δS, (6)
which can be estimated by OLS. Linearity would be a natural first approximation.
A much cleverer justification would be to rely on the distributional assumptions
regarding the wage offer distribution itself. This is indeed the approach proposed
by Lancaster (1985), who shows that under either Pareto or Lognormal forms
for the wage offer distribution, one can derive a conventional system of (two)
simultaneous linear equations. By virtue of this simple form, the identification
issues and the linear restrictions needed to identify the structural parameters are
rendered transparent. In general c will not be linear (it would be so were (ǫ, S)
jointly normally distributed). A standard RESET test may be used to gauge the
significance of this misspecification. A more general alternative will entail some
form of power-series approximation to the control function as in, for instance,
Newey, Powell and Vella (1999).
3. Data
Our data are taken from the first six waves of the European Community House-
hold Panel (EHCP), 1994-99. The ECHP is a survey based on a standardized
questionnaire administered annually to a representative panel of households and
individuals in 15 EU member states and offers detailed information on the respon-
dent’s labor market experience, inter al. (see EUROSTAT, 1999). We used data
for 13 of the countries, excluding Luxembourg and Sweden, where it is not possible
to follow individuals through time.2
The key pieces of information taken from the survey are reservation wages
and elapsed duration. In the EHCP each individual actively looking for work is
asked two questions pertaining first to desired hours of work and second to the
2The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Spain, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
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minimum income required to work these hours. The actual questions asked are
these: Assuming you could find regular work, how many hours would you prefer to
work in this new job? and What is the minimum net monthly income you would
accept to work [these number of] hours a week in this new job? We construct an
hourly net reservation wage, computed as the ratio of desired net monthly income
to the optimal number of hours. This variable is deflated by the respective national
consumer price index.
The other crucial variables are the duration of the current unemployment spell
and its ultimate duration. The ECHP sampling procedure considers only jobless
spells of individuals with previous work experience for whom we are able to identify
the onset of unemployment by month and year. Given that, with one exception,
we know the month and year of the interview we compute elapsed duration as
the period from the point of job loss up to the interview. (That one exception
is Germany, for which country we assume that all the interviews were conducted
in October.) As far as completed duration is concerned, since we can follow the
individual between surveys up to the point of reemployment, we can simply add the
residual calendar months spent unemployed in the subsequent interval to compute
elapsed duration.
Omitted variable bias is always an issue in the estimation of these models. By
including completed unemployment duration as a regressor we hope to partially
account for unobserved individual heterogeneity. This is because individuals whose
unobserved (to the researcher) characteristics that make them less employable are
more likely to stay unemployed.
In the present exercise, in addition to elapsed and completed duration, the RHS
arguments comprise a gender dummy, three schooling dummies, four age dummies,
five time dummies, thirteen country dummies, together with a continuous measure
of the overall unemployment rate at the time of the survey.3 Table 1 provides
descriptive statistics for the main arguments.
3We also experimented using a variable identifying the order of distinct unemployment spells as well as the
receipt (or otherwise) of unemployment insurance benefits. In neither case, however, were the results reported
below disturbed by their inclusion.
7
TABLE 1
Descriptive statistics
Variable Males Females
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Reservation wage (in logs) 1.156 0.378 1.411 0.378
Elapsed unemployment duration (in logs) 2.583 1.376 2.883 1.395
Completed unemployment duration (in logs) 3.345 0.834 3.341 0.902
Unemployment rate 12.513 4.370 11.819 4.423
Basic education 0.534 0.411
Secondary education 0.313 0.378
Tertiary education 0.133 0.174
Age dummies
17-25 0.379 0.425
26-35 0.296 0.307
36-45 0.177 0.186
46-55 0.124 0.076
Number of observations 5181 4822
Source: European Community Household Panel.
4. Findings
Summary results of fitting the reservation model separately for elapsed duration
and completed duration are given in the first two columns of Table 2. The elasticity
of reservation wages with respect to elapsed duration is negative but statistically
insignificant at conventional levels. The point estimate is tiny, suggesting that a
1 percent increase in the duration of an ongoing spell is associated with a 0.002
percent decrease in reservation wages. For its part, the elasticity of the reservation
wage with respect to completed duration is positive but again small in magnitude
(0.004) and statistically insignificant as well.
However, as is apparent from the penultimate column of the table, when both
duration variables are included in the reservation wage equation, each is statis-
tically significant. And indeed each elasticity is sharply higher: -.015 and .024,
respectively. Conditioning on completed duration, then, there is every indication
of a small but nontrivial and well-determined decline in reservation wages over the
course of joblessness. The positive association between completed duration and
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TABLE 2
The determinants of reservation wages
Specification
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Elapsed duration, U -0.002 -0.015 -0.025
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Completed duration, S 0.004 0.024 0.070
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes No
R2 0.418 0.418 0.419 0.166
Number of observations 10003 10003 10003 10003
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. The regressions
also include a continuous unemployment rate variable, a gender
dummy, 3 schooling, 4 age, and 5 year dummies.
Source: European Community Household Panel.
reservation wages is of course indicative of the reverse line of causation running
from reservation wages to jobless duration.
As noted above, the specifications in Table 1 include thirteen country dummies.
If, however, country heterogeneity may be expected to assist in the identification
of the impact of unemployment duration on reservation wages, we might usefully
drop the country dummies. In the final column of the table, therefore, we provide
results for the correct specification, including both duration measures but omitting
the country fixed effects. Compared with the results in the preceding column, it can
be seen that the point estimates for the duration measures strengthen in absolute
magnitude.4
5. Conclusions
The fact that reservation wages and unemployment duration are simultaneously
determined has preoccupied analysts in this area and arguably would have proven
more disruptive had direct information on reservation wages been more readily
available. In the present treatment, we have been able to exploit such information
to demonstrate how the true effect of the unemployment experience on reservation
4As a robustness check, we re-ran the reservation wage equation by gender.
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wages can be modeled. The approach which is to condition elapsed duration on
completed duration is analogous to that used by Abraham and Farber (1987) in
addressing the bias attaching to the pro-productive tenure argument in the aug-
mented Mincerian earnings function, which we have formally approached as an
omitted variables problem. We have shown that reservation wages are declining
over the course of the unemployment or jobless spell. While rejecting the assump-
tion of stationary reservation wages, we note that the elasticities of reservation
wage with respect to elapsed duration are rather small. By failing to control for
completed jobless duration we conflate the two opposing effects.
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Appendix A: Gender differences
Table A1 provides summary reservation wage regressions by gender. Observe
that, conditioning on completed duration, reservation wages are again de-
creasing in ongoing joblessness. But the results are stronger in both absolute
magnitude and statistical significance for males, as indeed is the reverse line
of causation running from reservation wages to employment duration. That
said, removing the country dummies yields almost identical point estimates
by gender.
TABLE A1
The determinants of reservation wages by gender
Variable Males Females
Elapsed duration U -0.020 -0.025 -0.009 -0.024
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Completed duration S 0.031 0.071 0.016 0.071
(0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010)
Country dummies Yes No Yes No
R2 0.371 0.154 0.468 0.155
Number of observations 5181 5181 4822 4822
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. The regressions
also include a continuous unemployment rate variable, a gender
dummy, 3 schooling, 4 age, and 5 year dummies.
Source: European Community Household Panel.
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